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Abstract Climate change has become one of the most
important issues for the sustainable development of social
well-being. China has made great efforts in reducing CO2
emissions and promoting clean energy. Pilot Emission
Trading Systems (ETSs) have been launched in two pro-
vinces and five cities in China, and a national level ETS
will be implemented in the third quarter of 2017, with
preparations for China’s national ETS now well under way.
In the meantime, a new round of China’s electric power
system reform has entered the implementation stage. Policy
variables from both electricity and emission markets will
impose potential risks on the operation of generation
companies (GenCos). Under this situation, by selecting key
variables in each domain, this paper analyzes the combined
effects of different allowance allocation methods and
power dispatching models on power system emission. Key
parameters are set based on a provincial power system in
China, and the case studies are conducted based on
dynamic simulation platform for macro-energy systems
(DSMES) software developed by the authors. The selected
power dispatching models include planned dispatch,
energy saving power generation dispatch and economic
dispatch. The selected initial allowance allocation methods
in the emission market include the grandfathering method
based on historical emissions and the benchmarking
method based on actual output. Based on the simulation
results and discussions, several policy implications are
highlighted to help to design an effective emission market
in China.
Keywords Emission trading system (ETS), Allowance
allocation, Power dispatching, Generation company,
Emission reduction
1 Introduction
The ever increasing concern of global climate change
has brought intensive attention to emission reduction,
which has become one of the most important issues for the
sustainable development of social well-being [1]. The
emission trading system (ETS), the clean development
mechanism (CDM), and joint implementation (JI) are
flexible emission reduction mechanisms put forward by the
Kyoto Protocol in 1997, among which the ETS has been
widely implemented by policy makers around the world.
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According to the Paris Agreement reached in 2015, gov-
ernments worldwide will strengthen their emission control
measures dealing with climate change threats, to limit
global warming to less than 2 degrees Celsius compared to
pre-industrial levels, and will also make efforts to limit the
temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius [2].
U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change was
issued in November 2014. China intends to achieve the
peaking of CO2 emissions around 2030, and plans to increase
the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption
to around 20% by 2030. Heretofore, two provinces (Hubei
and Guangdong) and five cities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai,
Chongqing, and Shenzhen) have launched pilot ETSs, and a
national ETS will be launched in 2017.
China is still in the process of industrialization and
urbanization, with a growing economy. According to the
‘‘China Electricity Industry Development Annual Report’’
issued by China Electricity Council (CEC), the national
electricity consumption in 2015 has reached 5.55 trillion
kWh, with a year-on-year growth rate of 0.5%. Although
the year-on-year growth rate decreases compared with
historical records, the demand is expected to continue
increasing. As important parts of the energy sector and the
major emission source, corporations in electricity sector are
primary participants in emission markets [3]. To realize the
low-carbon and sustainable power supply systems, power
distribution and transmission expansion planning should
consider emission constraints [4, 5] and the impact of an
ETS, and the design and implementation of an ETS should
also consider the development of the power system and the
electricity market.
Initial allowance allocation is the cornerstone for an ETS,
and the selection of allocation methods may have profound
influences on the supply-demand relationship of participants
in an ETS, and hence on the market dynamics. Other factors,
such as the output variations of companies, may also change
the supply-demand relationship. Currently, a new round of
China’s electric power system reform has entered the
implementation stage, and GenCos’ power output would be
gradually determined by market exchange instead of gen-
erating plans determined by authorities.
There has been considerable research about the existing
ETSs. Quantitative analyses have been done to estimate the
market risk in [6], to assess the impact of the EU ETS on
technological change in [7], to investigate the impacts of
policy adjustments in the EU ETS on carbon prices [8], and
to untangle the impacts of the EU ETS and the economic
crisis [9]. A mixed complementarity problem model is used
to assess the initial emission allowance allocation methods
in the Korean electricity market in [10]. With respect to
China’s existing pilot ETSs, their allowance mechanism is
compared with schemes in EU and California [11], his-
torical data on the price and trading volume is applied to
assess the financial performance of the Shenzhen carbon
market [12] and the distinct features of the Hubei ETS are
summarized in [13]. As regards China’s future national
ETS, a multi-regional computable general equilibrium
(CGE) model is adopted to examine the effects of a
nationwide carbon market on CO2 reduction efficiency
under different emission reduction targets [14] and an
online questionnaire has been conducted to identify the
factors affecting companies’ awareness and perception of
the ETS [15], however quantitative analysis is still inade-
quate in this area. Considering the development of China’s
ETS and electricity markets, this paper develops several
power dispatching and allowance allocation scenarios that
are likely to happen in the future. Based on a simplified
generation mix of one provincial power system in China,
several scenarios are simulated and analyzed. With regard
to the simulation results and discussions, several policy
implications are highlighted to help to design an effective
emission market in China.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 gives a brief review of the existing research on
the allowance allocation methods for the GenCos and
China’s power dispatching models. Section 3 introduces
the simulation platform and methodology, allowance allo-
cation models, and power dispatching models, and related
data and parameters are also given. Section 4 highlights the
policy implications for China’s national emission market
based on the case study results. The final section concludes
this paper.
2 Background and models
2.1 Allowance allocation models
There are two methods for allowance allocation in an
emission market: free allocation or auction, each having its
pros and cons. Auction is generally recognized as a more
equitable method, which provides more incentives for
emission reductions [16], and can produce an explicit ref-
erence price for the secondary market [17]. Free allocation
is more acceptable for stakeholders as it does not signifi-
cantly increase the emission cost. At the initial stage of an
ETS, free allocation is more favorable [18].
Grandfathering and benchmarking are the two major
free allocation methods. Under grandfathering, the alloca-
tion results are predictable for all participants. However,
the past emission reduction efforts cannot be considered in
the allocation, which is unfair for low carbon enterprises.
Besides, grandfathering cannot be applied to newly-built
units [19]. The basic idea of benchmarking is that the same
benchmark value is set for enterprises that produce the
same products [20]. Benchmarking can be based on either
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historical or actual output. If the future output levels are
greatly influenced by various factors, the benchmarking
method based on actual output levels is robust to output
variations. Benchmarking requires more information than
grandfathering and it is complex to set appropriate
benchmarks for different industries, which makes it hard to
apply at the initial stage of an ETS [21].
In the pilot ETSs in China, a majority of allowances are
allocated for free, with a relatively small portion being
auctioned in Shenzhen and Guangdong. Grandfathering is
applied to allocate allowances for cogeneration units in
Guangdong, and benchmarking is adopted to allocate
allowances for coal-fired and gas-fired units in Shanghai.
As China has a steadily growing economy, a benchmarking
method based on actual output (rather than historical out-
put) is planned to allocate allowances for generation
companies in the national level ETS, in order to balance
emission reduction and economic growth.
Considering the practice in pilot ETSs and the proposed
allocation method in a national level ETS in China, the two
allocation methods considered in this paper are a grand-
fathering method based on historical emissions and a
benchmarking method based on actual output.
2.1.1 Grandfathering based on historical emissions
By adopting the grandfathering method based on his-
torical emissions, free allowances are allocated based on
emitters’ historical emissions:
Qea;i ¼ Qhe;iki ð1Þ
where Qea,i is the quantity of freely allocated allowances
for emitter i; Qhe,i is the historical emission of emitter i; ki
is the free allocation factor for emitter i.
2.1.2 Benchmarking based on actual output
By adopting the benchmarking method based on actual
output, free allowances are allocated based on emitters’
actual output multiplied by a benchmark value. The
benchmark value can be the average emission rate, the
advanced emission rate in the industry, or the historical
emission rate of an emitter:
Qea;i ¼ Qao;iBiki ð2Þ
where Qao,i is the actual output of emitter i; Bi is the
benchmark value for emitter i.
2.2 Power dispatching models
Since 1985, electricity demand has increased at a rapid
pace along with China’s rapid economic development. In
order to fill in the growing gap between the electricity
supply and demand, China implemented a funding policy
for power generation [22]. To guarantee the performance of
investments, equal distribution of generation quantity for
different power units became the primary task of power
dispatching, which significantly promoted the development
of the power industry under the conditions at that time. By
1995, the total installed capacity of China had exceeded
200 million kilowatts, and the power shortage problem at
the national level had been basically solved. In 2003, in
order to adapt to the new situation after China’s electric
power system reform since 2002, the State Electricity
Regulatory Commission (SERC) of China put forward the
‘‘Open, Just and Fair’’ power dispatching principles.
Almost the same amount of annual generation utilization
hours would be allocated to power units within the same
category, without considering the differences in efficiency
among power units. On one hand, low-efficiency and high-
emission units could get enough earnings without technical
reform, and on the other hand, high-efficiency and low-
emission units would be under economic pressure, result-
ing in a lack of incentives to invest in efficient and envi-
ronmentally friendly power units [23]. Since the annual
utilization hours of power units are determined by
authorities and power dispatching centers are responsible
for dispatching power units using a consistent process [24],
it is essentially a planned dispatch. For easy reference, this
power dispatch model conforming to ‘‘Open, Just and Fair’’
principles will be called planned dispatch (PD) in this
paper. PD is still the major power dispatching model in
China.
In response to the growing demand for energy conser-
vation and emission reduction, ‘‘Energy Saving Power
Generation Dispatching Measures (Trial)’’ were issued in
2007, and five provinces (Jiangsu, Henan, Sichuan,
Guangdong and Guizhou) were selected as pilots to
implement the Energy Saving Generation Dispatch
(ESGD) method [25]. ESGD denotes that on the premise of
secure and reliable power supply, in accordance with the
energy saving and economic efficiency principles, renew-
able energy resources have priority of dispatch to generate
electricity, followed by fossil power generation resources,
in ascending order of emission intensity to minimize the
fuel consumption and emissions of pollutants [26].
On March 15, 2015, the China State Council issued the
‘‘Several Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the
State Council on Further Deepening the Reform of the
Electric Power System’’, also known as ‘‘Policy No. 9’’,
and determined the direction of electric reform, to promote
electricity bidding to put the market oriented allocation of
resources into full play, which was a confronting change to
the past planned dispatching model [27]. The competition
among GenCos is likely to become intense given that the
electricity supply is abundant. GenCos will apply more
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attention to improving the efficiency and management of
power plants for competitive advantage. Therefore, the
dispatching model is likely to be gradually transformed
into economic dispatch (ED) in the future.
Considering the development of China’s power dis-
patching models, PD, ESGD and ED are taken into account
in this paper. The unit startup and shutdown, ramp rates,
minimum output, and the transmission constraints are not
considered in the three dispatching models. The deviations
introduced by these simplifications are acceptable as this
paper focuses on long-term problems.
2.2.1 Planned dispatch
Under PD, based on the forecast annual load, the cor-
responding authorities approve the annual utilization hours
for each generation category, which will be successively
decomposed into the monthly generating plan and the daily
generating plan combined with appropriate adjustments
[28], which can be described by (3). For simplicity, this
paper does not consider load prediction deviations, and the
simulation program will assign the annual utilization hours
to the daily generating plan according to the daily load rate,
in order to meet the ‘‘Open, Just and Fair’’ principles.
XT
t¼1
hi;t  Hi
 !,
Hi

DH 8i 2 N ð3Þ
where hi,t is the actual utilization hours of unit i at day t; Hi
is the approved annual utilization hours for unit i; DH is the
relative deviation limit; T is the number of days in one
year; N is the number of units to be dispatched.
The electricity prices in PD are determined by the price
regulator according to the benchmark price policy, on the
basis of the economic life cycle of the power units, and
reasonable economic compensation and profits.
2.2.2 Energy saving generation dispatch
According to the official policy documents, the objec-
tive function of energy saving generation dispatch (ESGD)
can be described as minimizing the fuel consumption ff and
emissions of pollutants fe, which can be formulated by (4)–
(6) according to reference [29].
min F ¼ ½min ff ;min feT ð4Þ
ff ¼
XT
t¼1
XN
i¼1
qi;tkf ;i ð5Þ
fe ¼
XT
t¼1
XN
i¼1
qi;tke;i ð6Þ
where qi,t is the output of unit i at day t; kf,i is the fuel
consumption rate of unit i; ke,i is emission rate of unit i. In
order to facilitate the implementation of the ESDG, a pri-
ority schedule order shown in Table 1 is proposed in the
official policy documents. As in PD, the electricity prices
under ESGD are also determined by the benchmark price
policy.
It is important to note that in actual practice of ESGD,
units are not dispatched corresponding to this table in a
strict way, as there are long-term contracts that were signed
before the policy came into practice. In this paper, in order
to highlight the effect of ESGD, all units are dispatched
strictly in accordance to the priority schedule order.
2.2.3 Economic dispatch
The objective function of ED is to minimize the gen-
eration cost as follows.
min fc ¼
XT
t¼1
XN
i¼1
qi;tci ð7Þ
where fc is a linear cost function; ci is the marginal
generation cost of unit i, which consists of marginal fuel
cost and marginal emission cost as follows.
ci ¼ kf ;ipf ;i þ ke;ipe ð8Þ
where pf,i is the fuel price consumed by unit i; pe is the
carbon price.
Whether allocated for free or not, the economic value of
allowances includes the opportunity cost of using allow-
ances that could otherwise be sold in the market. Therefore,
the emission cost here refers to the opportunity cost, which
is the product of the emission rate and carbon price.
Table 1 Priority schedule order of the generation units in ESGD
Order Types of the power units
1 Renewable units with little adjustment capability including
wind, solar, oceanic energy and hydro units
2 Renewable units with adjusting capacities including hydro
units, biomass and geothermal energy units
3 Nuclear units
4 Combined cycle thermal units whose generation is decided by
heating load and resource comprehensive exploitation units
or in other words, waste power units
5 Gas-fired and coal gasification units
6 Other thermal units including a combined cycle thermal unit
without heating load
7 Oil-fired units
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3 Simulation methodology
3.1 Simulation tool and method
The research team of the authors has developed a novel
simulation tool dynamic simulation platform for macro-
energy systems (DSMES) that supports the dynamic
interactive simulation among cross-domain models, com-
puter agents and human participants [30]. As DSMES is an
extensible platform, the emission allowance pricing model
are added to DSMES for the purpose of emission market
research [31]. Moreover, supported by DSMES, experi-
ments with human subjects were conducted and major
driving factors of emission trading were extracted, which
could aid the construction of multi-agent stochastic models
with the same distribution characteristics [32, 33]. In this
paper, we implement different power dispatching models
and allowance allocation models in DSMES, based on
which all participants’ mathematical models are con-
structed and key parameters are set. Since the time
sequence can be adjusted flexibly, the simulations are
conducted based on a customizable time sequence of
related events, such as allowance allocation, bid submit-
ting, market clearing, emission calculation, and so on.
3.2 Models and parameters
3.2.1 Generation mix
The power system model in this paper is based on a
simplified generation mix of one provincial power system
in China. Six GenCos are included in the generation mix:
COAL_H, COAL_M and COAL_L own coal-fired units,
GAS_H and GAS_L own gas-fired units, and OIL owns
oil-fired units. Parameters of the six GenCos can be found
in Table 2. The marginal fuel cost is calculated based on
fuel prices and consumption rates. The simulation time
span is one year, consisting of day-to-day power market
and emission market transactions. For simplicity and to
focus the study on the overall performance of emission and
electricity markets, no strategic behaviors are considered in
either market and GenCos report their marginal generation
cost to the electricity market and purchase or sell the
allowances according to their emission balance. The daily
load curve is also based on actual data from the provincial
power system in China, and it is shown in Fig. 1 over a
1-year modeling period.
3.2.2 Selected carbon price levels
The average carbon price in the seven pilot ETSs in
China was 43 ¥/ton by the end of October 2014. To provide
a context for this figure, under ED, the priority schedule
order of units may be changed by the emission cost when
the carbon price level reaches threshold values that depend
on the parameters of GenCos. Three threshold prices cal-
culated from the data in Table 2 are 220, 347, 427 ¥/ton.
Compared with the average carbon price of 43 ¥/ton, the
threshold prices seem too high for case studies. However,
the maximum carbon price in the EU ETS was 32 €/ton
achieved in 2006, equivalent to 319.36 ¥/ton (according to
Table 2 Key parameters of GenCos
GenCos Fuel Technical Economic
Fuel price Installed capacity
(MW)
Fuel
consumption
rate
Emission rate
(g/kWh)
Marginal fuel cost
(¥/kWh)
Electricity price
(¥/kWh)
Annual
utilization (hour)
COAL_H 591.00
(¥/ton)
300 9 17 321 (g/kWh) 946 0.190 0.436 5325
COAL_M 600 9 5 298 (g/kWh) 879 0.176 5460
COAL_L 900 9 6 278 (g/kWh) 820 0.164 5559
GAS_H 1.77
(¥/m3)
60 9 10 0.211
(m3/kWh)
415 0.373 0.504 3387
GAS_L 800 9 4 0.180
(m3/kWh)
354 0.319 4336
OIL 5383.00
(¥/ton)
100 9 8 168 (g/kWh) 528 0.904 1.140 2391
Fig. 1 Daily load curve
940 Chao JIANG et al.
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2006 exchange rate 9.98 ¥/€), and through questionnaires,
Point Carbon indicates that the carbon price in the EU ETS
needs to be 38 €/ton to achieve effective emission reduc-
tion [34]. Therefore, the threshold prices above are in a
reasonable range.
3.2.3 Allowance allocation parameters
Benchmark value selection is based on the ‘‘Allocation
and Management Plan Shanghai 2013-2015’’ issued by
Shanghai Municipal Development and Reform Commis-
sion in November 2014. The benchmark value and free
allocation factor for units can be found in Table 3. Oil-fired
units are not included in the Shanghai ETS. Based on the
total allocated allowances under benchmarking in a BaU
scenario, the free allocation factor under grandfathering is
calculated as follows: first, as gas-fired units are low-
emission, the free allocation factor for gas-fired unit is set
to 100.0%; then the total allowances minus those for gas-
fired units are allowances for coal-fired units, which are
then divided by total historical emissions of coal-fired units
to calculate the free allocation factor under grandfathering
which is 90.0%.
4 Case studies
4.1 Scenarios settings
The two alternative allocation methods considered are
the grandfathering method based on historical emissions
and the benchmarking method based on actual output. The
three alternative power dispatching models considered are
PD, ESGD and ED.
China’s current primary power dispatching model is PD,
and a national ETS is yet to be implemented. Therefore, PD
without emission trading (ET) is set as the BaU scenario,
from which the simulation results are used as basic data for
two allocation methods in other scenarios. The impact of
different allowance allocation methods is studied in the PD
with ET scenario, the ESDG with ET scenario and the ED
with ET scenario. Under ED, as the carbon price may
change the priority schedule order in the electricity market,
the effects of different carbon price levels can be analyzed.
4.2 Simulation results
4.2.1 Scenario 1: PD without ET (BaU scenario)
The installed capacity of coal-fired units accounts for
74.6% of the total capacity of thermal power units and the
annual utilization hours of coal-fired units are more than
those of gas-fired units. Thus in this scenario, the emissions
of GenCo COAL_H, COAL_M and COAL_L account for
90.5% of the total system emissions, the simulation results
can be found in Table 4.
4.2.2 Scenario 2: PD with ET
An ETS is introduced in this scenario on the basis of the
BaU scenario. As the dispatching model remains unchan-
ged, the actual generation output of units is the same as the
historical pattern and the allocation results of grandfa-
thering and benchmarking are similar.
Compared to the allocation results with grandfathering,
GenCos with higher energy efficiency within the same
category can obtain more allowances with benchmarking,
such as COAL_L among the coal-fired GenCos and
GAS_L among the gas-fired GenCos as shown in Table 5.
In this scenario, carbon prices cannot change GenCos’
profit in the electricity market, but can change GenCos’
profit in the emission market. With a carbon price of 427 ¥/
t and benchmarking, the expenditure of COAL_H in the
emission market accounts for 22.1% of its profit in the
electricity market.
4.2.3 Scenario 3: ESGD with ET
Under ESGD, as units are dispatched based on fuel
consumption rates from low to high, so the generation
output of COAL_L, GAS_H and GAS_L increase
Table 3 Key parameters of the benchmarking method
GenCos Benchmark value (tCO2/MWh) Free allocation factor
COAL_H 0.8187 100%
COAL_M 0.7953
COAL_L 0.7563
GAS_H 0.3800
GAS_L
Table 4 Simulation results (PD without ET)
GenCos Generation
(billion kWh)
Profit in electricity
market (billion ¥)
Emissions
(million ton)
COAL_H 27.16 6.68 25.69
COAL_M 16.38 4.26 14.40
COAL_L 30.02 8.17 24.62
GAS_H 2.03 0.27 0.84
GAS_L 13.88 2.57 4.91
OIL 1.91 0.45 1.01
TOTAL 91.38 22.40 71.47
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significantly, resulting in the total emissions decreasing
15.0% compared to those of the BaU scenario. Due to its
lowest dispatch priority, GenCo OIL does not generate
power during the whole year shown in Table 6. As for
Scenario 2, the carbon price still cannot change GenCos’
profit in the electricity market.
4.2.4 Scenario 4: ED with ET
Under ED, the introduction of an emission cost can
change the clearing price in the electricity market. Four
different carbon price levels are analyzed in this
scenario.
When the carbon price equals 43 ¥/ton, the generation of
COAL_H, COAL_M and COAL_L accounts for 98.4% of
the total generation. As they are high emission units, the
system emissions increase by 9.0% compared to those in
the BaU scenario. The results are shown in Table 7.
As the carbon price rises, low-emission units are more
competitive, resulting in lower system emissions shown in
Tables 8, 9 and 10. When the carbon price increases to 427
¥/ton, the system emissions are close to those under ESGD.
Compared with grandfathering, many fewer allowances are
allocated to high-emission units under benchmarking,
which alters their emission balance from surplus to
shortage.
Under ED, a rising carbon price will not only affect
GenCos’ profits in the emission market, but also in the
electricity market. With the emission trading profits con-
tinuing to rise, GenCos should focus more on how to
manage carbon assets when the carbon price is high
enough.
4.3 Discussions and policy implications
4.3.1 Variations of power dispatching models should be
considered when choosing allowance allocation
models
If the power dispatching model and the power demand
remain unchanged, different allocation methods will have
minor influences on the simulation results. However, if the
power dispatching model changes, for example under
ESGD or ED, GenCos’ annual emission unbalance varies
significantly under different allocation methods.
The defect of the grandfathering method based on his-
torical emissions is that past efforts to reduce emissions are
overlooked. However, if allocated by grandfathering, high-
Table 5 Simulation results (PD with ET)
GenCos Generation
(billion kWh)
Profit in the electricity
market (billion ¥)
Emissions
(million ton)
Grandfathering (million ton) Benchmarking (million ton)
Allowances
allocated
Emission
balance
Allowances
allocated
Emission
balance
COAL_H 27.16 6.68 25.69 23.13 -2.56 22.24 -3.45
COAL_M 16.38 4.26 14.40 12.96 -1.44 13.03 -1.37
COAL_L 30.02 8.17 24.62 22.17 -2.45 22.70 -1.92
GAS_H 2.03 0.27 0.84 0.84 0.00 0.77 -0.07
GAS_L 13.88 2.57 4.91 4.91 0.00 5.27 0.36
OIL 1.91 0.45 1.01 / / / /
TOTAL 91.38 22.40 71.47 64.01 -6.45 64.01 -6.45
Table 6 Simulation results (ESGD with ET)
GenCos Generation
(billion kWh)
Profit in the electricity
market (billion ¥)
Emissions
(million ton)
Grandfathering (million ton) Benchmarking (million ton)
Allowances
allocated
Emission
balance
Allowances
allocated
Emission
balance
COAL_H 3.13 0.78 2.99 23.13 20.14 2.59 -0.4
COAL_M 9.69 2.52 8.51 12.96 4.45 7.71 -0.8
COAL_L 45.27 12.31 37.12 22.17 -14.95 34.24 -2.88
GAS_H 5.26 0.69 2.18 0.84 -1.34 2 -0.18
GAS_L 28.03 5.19 9.92 4.91 -5.01 10.65 0.73
OIL 0.00 0.00 0.00 / / / /
TOTAL 91.38 21.49 60.72 64.01 3.29 57.19 -3.53
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emission GenCos can be compensated for lost revenue,
resulting from reduced generation, by selling the conse-
quent surplus allowances, which can be regarded as a
viable economic compensation mechanism.
The benchmarking method based on actual output is
robust to dispatching model variations, so the emission
balance of each GenCos is roughly equivalent and easy to
predict. On the other hand, it may reduce the participants’
trading enthusiasm in the emission market, affecting that
market’s liquidity.
4.3.2 Current carbon price is inadequate to stimulate low
carbon technology
The simulation results in scenario 4 illustrate the carbon
price incentives for technological innovation. For the
generation mix considered in this paper, only when the
carbon price is higher than 220 ¥/ton can the priority
schedule order of power units be changed. The average
price of China’s pilot emission market (43 ¥/ton) and the
recent EU ETS carbon price (about 58 ¥/ton) are both
Table 7 Simulation results (ED with ET, carbon price is 43 ¥/ton)
GenCos Generation
(billion kWh)
Profit in the electricity
market (billion ¥)
Emissions
(million ton)
Grandfathering (million ton) Benchmarking (million ton)
Allowances
allocated
Emission
balance
Allowances
allocated
Emission
balance
COAL_H 16.94 1.26 16.02 23.13 7.11 13.87 -2.15
COAL_M 25.72 1.67 22.61 12.96 -9.65 20.46 -2.15
COAL_L 47.30 3.62 38.79 22.17 -16.62 35.77 -3.02
GAS_H 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.84 0.84 0 0
GAS_L 1.42 0.02 0.51 4.91 4.4 0.55 0.04
OIL 0.00 0.00 0.00 / / / /
TOTAL 91.38 6.57 77.93 64.01 -13.92 70.65 -7.28
Table 8 Simulation results (ED with ET, carbon price is 220 ¥/ton)
GenCos Generation
(billion kWh)
Profit in the electricity
market (billion ¥)
Emissions
(million ton)
Grandfathering (million ton) Benchmarking (million ton)
Allowances
allocated
Emission
balance
Allowances
allocated
Emission
balance
COAL_H 4.28 0.90 4.07 23.13 19.06 3.52 -0.55
COAL_M 25.72 5.58 22.61 12.96 -9.65 20.46 -2.15
COAL_L 47.30 10.82 38.79 22.17 -16.62 35.77 -3.02
GAS_H 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.84 0.84 0 0
GAS_L 14.08 1.10 4.98 4.91 -0.07 5.35 0.37
OIL 0.00 0.00 0.00 / / / /
TOTAL 91.38 18.40 70.45 64.01 -6.44 65.10 -5.35
Table 9 Simulation results (ED with ET, carbon price is 347 ¥/ton)
GenCos Generation
(billion kWh)
Profit in the electricity
market (billion ¥)
Emissions
(million ton)
Grandfathering (million ton) Benchmarking (million ton)
Allowances
allocated
Emission
balance
Allowances
allocated
Emission
balance
COAL_H 3.15 1.04 2.99 23.13 20.14 2.59 -0.40
COAL_M 12.60 4.07 11.08 12.96 1.88 10.03 -1.05
COAL_L 46.45 14.93 38.10 22.17 -15.93 35.14 -2.96
GAS_H 1.15 0.17 0.48 0.84 0.36 0.44 -0.04
GAS_L 28.03 4.65 9.92 4.91 -5.01 10.65 0.73
OIL 0.00 0.00 0.00 / / / /
TOTAL 91.38 24.86 62.57 64.01 1.44 58.85 -3.72
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inadequate to motivate emission reduction. The maximum
carbon price in the EU ETS was 32 €/ton in 2006, equiv-
alent to 319.36 ¥/ton (according to the 2006 exchange rate
9.98 ¥/€), and this could be sufficient to provide a sub-
stantial incentive.
4.3.3 Power dispatching model plays a significant role
in fulfilling emission reduction task
The different objective functions of dispatching models
result in different emission reduction effects and electricity
purchasing cost as shown in Fig. 2. Under ED, if the car-
bon price is 43 ¥/ton, system emissions increase by 9.0%
compared to those under PD. Only when the carbon price
rises to 220 ¥/ton are the system emissions about equal to
those under PD. And only when the carbon price is ele-
vated to 427 ¥/ton are the system emissions about equal to
those under ESGD.
Under ESGD, the emission reduction task can be
achieved with lowest electricity purchasing cost, because
the generation quantity and price are rigidly regulated by
authorities. In this case, GenCos are exposed to emission
price risk, as their emission cost cannot be covered in the
electricity market. Therefore, several economic
compensation mechanisms should be set up for GenCos to
ensure long-term electricity adequacy when reducing
emissions. While under ED, as emission costs can be
passed through to the electricity price, the load service
entity or the end users will be exposed to emission price
risk.
Obviously, the power dispatching models play a sig-
nificant role in fulfilling the emission reduction target. The
impact of carbon pricing on electricity prices should be
studied carefully before implementing a national level
ETS, especially when China is carrying out a new round of
electricity reform.
4.3.4 Strategic behaviors of market participants should be
considered in studying electricity and emission
market
In this paper, GenCos report their marginal generation
cost to the electricity market as can be found in Sec-
tion 2.2.3, assuming no strategic behaviors in either the
electricity or the emission market. In fact, GenCos can
make flexible trading strategies in the emission market to
minimize purchasing cost or maximize income from sales,
as well as in the electricity market. A good trading strategy
can help in reducing GenCos’ emission cost and in winning
an advantageous position in the competitive market.
It is important to consider strategic behaviors in
designing a well-functioning emission market. However, it
is a challenge to represent market participants’ strategic
behaviors in modeling and simulation. In our previous
work, a hybrid simulation method combining experimental
and computational economics was proposed to model
market behaviors, and this has been applied in modelling
GenCos’ trading behavior in an emission market [33].
Follow-up research will focus on the interaction between
electricity and emission markets considering the strategic
behaviors of market participants, based on the hybrid
simulation method developed by the authors.
Table 10 Simulation results (ED with ET, carbon price is 427 ¥/ton)
GenCos Generation
(billion kWh)
Profit in the electricity
market (billion ¥)
Emissions
(million ton)
Grandfathering (million ton) Benchmarking (million ton)
Allowances
allocated
Emission
balance
Allowances
allocated
Emission
balance
COAL_H 3.15 1.27 2.99 23.13 20.14 2.59 -0.40
COAL_M 9.68 3.82 8.51 12.96 4.45 7.71 -0.8
COAL_L 46.45 18.08 38.10 22.17 -15.93 35.14 -2.96
GAS_H 4.07 0.76 1.69 0.84 -0.85 1.55 -0.14
GAS_L 28.03 6.55 9.92 4.91 -5.01 10.65 0.73
OIL 0.00 0.00 0.00 / / / /
TOTAL 91.38 30.48 61.21 64.01 2.80 57.64 -3.57
Fig. 2 Total power purchase cost and emissions
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5 Conclusion
GenCos are the primary participants in the emission
market, and the allowance allocation for them is one of the
most important tasks when designing the national ETS.
Meanwhile, further electricity reform is underway in
China, and the power dispatching model will be trans-
formed into a market based mechanism. On one hand,
different emission allowance methods will affect GenCos’
position in the emission market, and on the other hand the
emission price may affect the GenCos’ competitiveness in
electricity market. Against this background, based on a
simplified generation mix of one provincial power system
in China, this paper analyzes the combined effects of dif-
ferent initial allowance allocation methods and power
dispatching models on power system emission reductions.
Based on simulation results and discussions, several policy
implications are highlighted to help to design an effective
emission market in China.
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